SUNDAY, AUGUST 10TH
4:00pm - 5:30pm
Registration
5:30pm - 7:00pm
Dinner
7:30pm - 8:00pm
Welcome/Introduction to Society
8:00pm - 9:30pm
Reception
MONDAY,
AUGUST 11TH
Session
I Chair: J. Craig Hanks
9:00am - 11:00am
Peter
Mehl, Matters of Meaning: Authenticity, Autonomy
and Authority in Kierkegaard
Charles
Harvey,
Authority, Autonomy, Authenticity: An Etiological Understanding
11:00am
- 12:30pm LUNCH
Session
II Chair: Erin Wilkes
12:30pm - 2:30pm
Michael
McKenna,
A Speaker-Meaning Theory of Moral Responsibility
James
Sauer,
Language, Ethics and Meaning: A Phenomenological Correlation
of Morality and Self-Conscious Signification
2:30pm -
2:45pm BREAK
Session
III Chair: Jack Weir
2:45pm - 4:45pm
4:45:pm -
7:30pm DINNER
7:30pm
BUSINESS MEETING
TUESDAY,
AUGUST 12TH
Session
IVChair: Richard Cohen
9:00am - 11:00am
Session V
Time: TBA
TAKE YOUR
PICK!
Philosophy
on the Mount - We will hike to a summit in the Rockies
and hold an informal discussion on environmental philosophy.
If we are really lucky, Holmes Rolston and Will Aiken
will join us.
OR
Environmental
Education for the Twenty-first Century - Patricia
Thompson will lead a discussion group on her recently
edited book, Environmental Education for the Twenty-first
Century.
WEDNESDAY,
AUGUST 13TH
Session
VI Chair: James Sauer
9:00am - 11:00am
11:00am
- 12:30pm LUNCH
Session
VII Chair: Sharon E. Hartline
12:30pm - 2:30pm
2:30pm -
2:45pm BREAK
Session
VIII Chair: Robert Paul Churchill
2:45pm - 4:45pm
Gail
Presbey, Akan Chiefs and Queen Mothers in Contemporary
Ghana: Examples of Democracy or Accountable Authority
Jennifer
Stiff, The Question of National Autonomy: The
Case of Cuba
4:45pm -
7:30pm DINNER
Session
IX
7:30pm
THURSDAY,
AUGUST 14TH
Session
XChair: J. Craig Hanks
9:00am - 11:30am
11:30pm
- 12:30pm LUNCH
Session
XI Chair: Lani Roberts
12:30pm - 3:30pm
3:30pm -
3:45pm BREAK
Session
XII Chair: Joe F. Jones
3:45pm - 5:45pm
5:45pm -
7:30pm DINNER
Session
XIII
7:30pm
FRIDAY,
AUGUST 15th
7am - 10am
FALL'S RIVER ROAD TRIP
Session
XIV
10:00am - 12:00pm
12:00pm
- 1:30pm LUNCH
Session
XV
1:30pm - 4:30pm
Bentley
Davis,
Why the Private Sphere
Andrew
Fiala,
Liberal Capitalism and the Dissolution of the Public/Private
Distinction
Joe
Wagner,
A Hollow Core: The Poverty of Conservatism as Political
Philosophy
SATURDAY,
AUGUST 16th
Session
XVI
9:00am - 11:00am
Trudy
Conway,
Cultural Authority and Autonomy: The Role of the Philosopher
in the Contemporary World
Erin
McKenna and Craig Hanks,
The Culture of Suburbanization, Housework, and the Fragmentation
of Identity
11:00am
- 12:30pm LUNCH
Session
XVII
12:30pm - 3:30pm
SUNDAY,
AUGUST 17TH
SAFE TRAVELS!
MICHAEL BARNHART
Department of Philosophy
Kingsborough Community College, CUNY
Authenticity, Freedom, and the Ethics of
Moral Neutrality
The present paper is part of a much larger
examination of the contrast between Confucianism and Buddhist
social philosophies in order to ascertain their respective
implications for democratic politics. In this context, I
examine the concepts of release and freedom (moksa and nirvana)
in the Buddhist tradition, particularly as understood in
a contemporary setting. These concepts suggest a form of
autonomy that contrast interestingly with J. S. Mill's version
of liberty and J. L. Mackie's concept of rights in a rights-based
moral theory.
BIO NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME
*******************************************
STEPHANIE
BAUER
<slbauer@artsci.wustl.edu>
Taking Responsibility: A Study of Authority
and Self-Transformation
In both philosophical and political arenas
we are bombarded with the call for individuals to take greater
responsibility for themselves. Yet, what does this mean?
Are there limits to what we should take responsibility for?
Are there criteria for how we should take responsibility?
Current political rhetoric appears to indicate that there
is no end to the good that can be done by individuals taking
responsibility for their lives. Philosophical literature
has also provided a largely positive view of this activity
and remains unhelpful in understanding the conditions of
its appropriateness. This paper attempts to begin such a
task by examining particular ways that taking responsibility
functions in our lives. I consider this approach to be pragmatic.
It assumes that the criteria for a practice can only be
determined by investigating the purposes and the consequences
of that practice in our communities.
This paper argues that taking responsibility
in Western societies is, in part, a claim to and an assertion
of a particular type of authority. It is an authority that
is intimately related to the possibility of self-transformation,
and claiming this authority can do potential harm to both
oneself and to others. I will only have time to point towards
possible criteria for taking responsibility that emerge
at the end of this paper, but I believe this discussion
is one step in that direction.
BIO NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME
*******************************************
ANGELA BOLTE
Department of Philosophy
Washington University
<bolte@twinearth.wustl.edu>
Anger, Love, and Autonomy
Harry Frankfurt has recently moved away from
a split-level conception of autonomy and has begun to grant
love a significant role in autonomy. While Frankfurt is
correct in moving toward including some emotions into a
conception of autonomy, he incorrectly excludes the other
emotions that ought to be included in this conception. To
illustrate how emotions other than love can play a role
in autonomy, I will explore Frankfurt's position on love
and autonomy. Second, I will focus on two problematic areas
of Frankfurt's position, namely, selflessness and emotions
as evaluative judgments. Finally, given that Frankfurt's
interpretation of these areas leads to an artificial restriction
of the emotions, I will expand Frankfurt's position to the
other emotions. This project will illustrate that while
Frankfurt is correct to advocate the inclusion of emotions
into autonomy, his account ought to be expanded to include
other emotions.
Angela Bolte is a Ph.D. candidate
in Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. She
has written on issues in liberalism and same-sex marriage.
She plans to explore issues of autonomy in her dissertation.
*******************************************
NOEL BOULTING
School of Arts and Sciences
Great Falls University
Autonomy, Attention and Decreation
For those thinkers for whom the intellectual
bankruptcy of Stalinism did not lead to the abandonment
of socialism, the notion of Autonomy has enjoyed a good
press. For Habermas, a contemporary neo-representative of
the Frankfurt School, and interest in Autonomy and Responsibility
coincides with the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake
in self-reflection; for Gramsci moral responsibility\ is
exercised when the individual constructs a view of the world
in a conscious and critical way. Simone Weil, in her later
writings at least, seems to reject this apparent advocacy
of human Autonomy. My paper attempts to address the question
"How can her position be
explained?" and "How far is her alternative
a coherent one?" It tries to do this by distinguishing the
different epistemic levels she constructs in her reworking
of Plato's philosophy.
Noel Boulting studied under Richard
S. Peters as the London Institute of Education to obtain
his Academic Diploma in the Philosophy of Education; under
David Hamlyn and Stuart Brown at Birbeck College, London,
to obtain his first degree in Philosophy; and under Imre
Lakatos and John Watkins at the London School of Economics
to obtain his mastership in the Philosophy of Science. He
has taught Philosophy for the Extra-Mural Department, University
of London, Philosophy of Education at Trent Polytechnic
and Educational Studies at Mid-Kent College of Higher and
Further Education. His philosophy club, NOBOSS, was formed
in 1977 on the basis of initially forwarding an interest
in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead and, then, in the Philosophy
of C. S. Peirce since such interests could not be pursued
in English Universities outside of Theology Departments
at that time. NOBOSS meets at least twice a year, and professors
of Philosophy form America and Germany have attended its
sessions. His publications include articles on C. S. Peirce,
Edward Bullough and Thomas Hobbes.
*******************************************
JOHN CLARK
<clark@beta.loyno.edu>
The Future of Social Ecology
Social ecology is (with deep ecology and
ecofeminism) one of the most important new "radical ecologies"
to emerge in the field of ecophilosophy. I interpret social
ecology as a rich and expansive tradition with roots in
holistic, communitarian and dialectical philosophy and social
theory. I argue for a social ecology that is philosophically
a form of dialectical holism and suggest that this theoretical
perspective has far-reaching implications for ontology,
ecophilosophy, ethics and value theory, and social and political
thought.
I present a vision of a social ecology that
is more radically dialectical, dialogical, open, and self-transformative
than the more systematic, programatic and sectarian social
position that has been defended by social ecologist Murray
Bookchin.
John P. Clark is Professor of Philosophy
and Chair of the Environmental Studies Program at Loyola
University, New Orleans. His books include Renewing the
Earth: The Promise of Social Ecology, (ed.), Liberty,
Equality, Geography: The Social Thought of Elisee Reclus,
Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical
Ecology (co-ed.), and the forthcoming A Social Ecology:
Essays in Dialectical Holism.
*******************************************
TRUDY CONWAY
Department of Philosophy
Mount Saint Mary's College
<conway@msmary.edu>
Cultural Autonomy: The Role of the Philosopher
in the Contemporary World
Among the fragments published in Zettel,
one finds one of Wittgenstein's most enigmatic comments,
namely, that "The philosopher is not a citizen of any community
of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher." The
paper attempts to make sense of this statement in the context
of Wittgenstein's work and current philosophical debate
regarding cultural pluralism. It explores the role of the
philosopher in relation to the authority of cultural tradition
and cultural pluralism.
Trudy Conway is presently Professor
of Philosophy at Mount Saint Mary's College in Emmitsburg,
Maryland and resides close to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.
Her scholarly work focuses on twentieth century philosophy,
especially that of Wittgenstein and Hermeneutics. She is
author of *Wittgenstein on Foundations* (Humanities Press
International, 1989) and articles focusing on studies of
Wittgenstein and the broad topic of crosscultural understanding
and dialogue. She has taught at Pahlavi University in Iran
and has special interest in Middle East studies. She has
recently received an NEH Professorship for a three year
project entitled "Recognizing, Envisioning and Understanding
the Other."
*******************************************
BENTLEY DAVIS
Department of Philosophy
Washington University
<bentley@twinearth.wustl.edu>
Why the Private Sphere?
Since the first rumblings of the second-wave
of feminism, writers have examined the private sphere. Many
feminist writers have argued that the private sphere has
harmful effects and therefore have called for its dissolution
or deconstruction. While it may be the case that some interpretations
of the private sphere allow for harmful activities, it is
not the case that the notion of the private sphere is in
and of itself harmful. In fact, given our current political
and legal systems, I feel that the only way to create positive
change is, at least temporarily, to bolster the notion of
the private sphere. In this paper, I will address the following
three questions: (1) What is the private sphere? (2) Is
the notion of the private sphere harmful? Finally, (3) should
we maintain the notion of the private sphere?
Bentley Davis is a graduate student
pursuing her Ph.D. in Philosophy at Washington University
in St. Louis.
*******************************************
VIRGINIA
DE OLIVEIRA-ALVES
Department of Philosophy
Loyola University
Race, Culture, and Justice: Separatism
or Integration?
This paper addresses the separatism-versus-integration
debate within the problematic of race and race relations.
I argue in favor of integration, showing that racial minorities
are disadvantaged by institutions or the normal practices
of society. My position is that, since disadvantage is structural,
that is, since it is an effect of social practices, it cannot
be addressed adequately by separatist approaches. A solution
to this problem must involve structural transformations,
which affect both the disadvantaged and the privileged.
As such, it also promotes integration. But integration can
be respectful of cultural difference nonetheless, precisely
by being directed at the political domain: by enabling racial
minorities to exercise equal citizenship and thus making
it possible for them to preserve their cultural traditions
themselves, if they so desire. I draw on Jurgen Habermas's
model of rights to clarify how, given the requirement for
equal treatment, an integrationist solution can address
structural inequality, while leaving it up to those concerned
whether to preserve cultural styles, and the manner in which
these are to be preserved.
Virginia de Oliveira-Alves is a graduate
student in Philosophy at Loyola University in Chicago. Her
areas of research include social and political philosophy,
Habermas, feminism, and race relations. She is currently
writing her dissertation on issues of equal treatment with
respect to race- and gender-based disadvantage, based on
Jurgen Habermas's theory of rights.
*******************************************
RICHARD DeTAR
<RDetar@aol.com>
Just Following Orders: Revisited
In this paper, I argue that the practice
of "just following orders" is not the definition or quintessence
of evil in the twentieth century but is, rather, ethically
neutral. Its goodness and evil depends largely on the nature
of the orders themselves which are being followed.
Richard DeTar is from rural Indiana.
He has a B.A. in Political Science from Kalamazoo College
and an M.A. in the same subject from Western Michigan University.
He is currently studying for a Ph.D. in Philosophy at Southern
Illinois University in
Carbondale and is writing his dissertation,
entitled "Scientific Materialism and the Roman Catholic
Religion in the Early Santayana" which he expects to finish
this year. He currently lives in Denver, Colorado where
he has been employed by the Social Security Administration
for 21 years. He is married to Judith James, an attorney
who is studying interior design. They just bought a big,
old house in downtown Denver, and they have three cats.
This will be Richard's third SPCW conference.
*******************************************
MICHAEL
ELDRIDGE
Philosophy Department
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
<mleldrid@unccvm.uncc.edu>
Toward a Deweyan Political Technology
John Dewey's proposal to intelligize our
common practices has often been criticized for being unworkable:
In the partisan, power-driven society in which we live one's
approach must be much more realistic and tougher than Dewey's
mushy proposal to identify common problems, develop possible
resolutions, and then choose collectively the solution that
survives a collaborative, experimental process. While Deweyan
educators are talking things over, the power players will
be dividing up the spoils -- and underfunding education.
I expand on this criticism, then use a recent book by an
activist lawyer, Randy Shaw, to supply enough of the needed
political technology to suggest that Dewey's proposal is
feasible at the local level. I also draw from Shaw's book
and a history of neighborhood organizing by Robert Fisher
a hybrid organizational model--social service-plus-political
education--that provides what is needed to sustain the activism
Shaw describes. My aim, then, is to contribute to the rounding
out of the Deweyan project of social intelligence by exploiting
Shaw and Fisher's work and situating the resulting political
technology in the Deweyan philosophical context.
Michael Eldridge teaches philosophy
at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. A former
Protestant minister and community and political organizer,
Eldridge has also taught at Spring Hill College (Mobile)
and Queens College (Charlotte). He is currently revising
a manuscript, "Transforming Experience: John Dewey's Cultural
Instrumentalism", which is scheduled to be published by
Vanderbilt University Press in 1998. He holds degrees from
Yale University (B.D.) Columbia University (M.A.), and the
University of Florida (Ph.D.).
*******************************************
M. CARMELA
EPRIGHT
Department of Philosophy
Loyola University, Chicago
<ceprigh@orion.it.luc.edu>
Freedom and Ambiguity: The Ethics of
Simone de Beauvoir
Until very recently, studies of Simone de
Beauvoir have presented her either as the lifelong confidant,
editor, and companion of Jean-Paul Sartre, or as an early
(and, some argue, dated and privileged) feminist and author
of The Second Sex. Beauvoir's significance is thought
to stem primarily (if not exclusively) from the exemplary
nature of her struggle to free herself from the constraints
of a class-bound, restrictive upbringing; from her ability
to write compellingly about the situation of the middle-class
women of her own time; and finally, from her dedication
to the principles of existentialist philosophy -- as those
principles were dictated by her lover, Sartre. Although
Beauvoir's own philosophical writings include two monographs
and numerous essays, articles, and letters, her contribution
to the discipline has largely been ignored or dismissed
as a mere footnote to Sartrean existentialism.
This paper seeks to reverse this trend by
examining Beauvoir's contribution to philosophical ethics
through a consideration of two of her essays, "Pyrrhus et
Cineas" and "The Ethics of Ambiguity." While Beauvoir's
ethical approach is clearly existentialist, it differs in
important ways from that offered by Sartre. By closely comparing
Sartre and Beauvoir's writing on such key issues as intersubjectivity,
freedom and one's moral obligation to others, I will outline
the specific ways in which Beauvoir departed from Sartrean
existentialism, and argue that ultimately, it was Beauvoir
ideas that influenced Sartre's thought with regard to ethics.
Carmela Epright is STILL a graduate
student at Loyola University of Chicago, although this paper
stems from the final chapter of her dissertation (Hurrah!).
Her areas of specialization include, contemporary ethical
theory, applied ethics, social and political philosophy
and feminist theory. Her recent work has included papers
on the Impartialism/Contextualism debate in ethics; traditional
medical ethics approaches and the moral self; and social
justice and care ethics.
*******************************************
ANDREW ESHLEMAN
Department of Philosophy
University of California, Riverside
Identification and Responsibility for
Character
In this paper I seek to develop the suggestion
that one is responsible for one's character traits, not
in virtue of being the original author of those traits,
but insofar as one takes responsibility for them. One takes
responsibility for one's character when one identifies oneself
with those motivations which constitute one's dispositions
thereby making them more genuinely one's own. I borrow the
notion of identification from proponents of the "split-level"
account of motivation. According to such an account, persons
have the unique capacity, not only to desire various courses
of action (at the first-order level), but also to care (at
the second-order level) about which desires lead them to
act. On this view, one identifies with a first-order motivation
when one forms a second-order desire to have, or be moved
to act by, some first-order desire.
I first argue that the notion of identification
employed in split-level accounts has typically been understood
either too weakly or too robustly. When understood weakly,
it simply marks the absence of conflict in one's highest-order
preferences and this fails to capture an important sense
in which making a motivation one's own requires that one
be active in relation to the motivation. When interpreted
more robustly, one's identifications result from critical
reflection on one's conception of the good. This would entail
that only the most reflective of persons could identify
with and thereby take responsibility for their character
traits. Alternatively, I propose that to identify with a
dispositional trait in the relevant sense is to make a second-order
judgment that it is acceptable or good to lead one's life
so disposed. I next argue that certain split-level theorists
have been wrong to associate an agent's responsibility for
her character with her present identifications, maintaining
instead that responsibility for one's character traits rests
on the exercise of one's capacity for judgment in the course
of their development.
Andrew Eshleman is currently completing
his doctoral degree at the University of California, Riverside.
His research focuses on issues in moral philosophy and philosophy
of religion. He is author of "Alternative Possibilities
and the Free Will Defense", forthcoming in Religious
Studies.
*******************************************
ANDREW FIALA
<Fialaag@Ctrvax.Vanderbilt.edu>
Liberal Capitalism and the Dissolution
of the Public/Private Distinction
ABSTRACT AND BIO NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS
TIME
*******************************************
J. CRAIG
HANKS
<hanksj@email.uah.edu>
The Culture of Suburbanization, Housework,
and the Fragmentation of Identity
ABSTRACT AND BIO NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS
TIME
*******************************************
SHARON HARTLINE
Philosophy and Religious Studies Department
Radford University
<shartlin@runet.edu>
Improvisations: Ahimsa and The Authentic
Self
The Ghandian concept of Ahimsa involves both
positive and negative dimensions. On the one hand, it is
the negative injunction to do no harm and the positive injunction
to love. I will examine the concepts of nobility and detachment
in order to explicate these two dimensions of Ghandi's principle.
My aim will be to uncover the conception of the authentic
human self that underlies Ghandi's viewpoint.
In order to better understand this conception
of the authentic self and the associated principle of Ahimsa,
it is helpful to imagine oneself confronted by certain situations
in which issues of violence and non-violence are central.
Toward this end, I will invite members of the conference
to participate in a series of improvisations involving role
playing in conflict situations and conclude with a discussion
of the improvisations.
Sharon Hartline is Assistant Professor
in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at
Radford University in Virginia where she teaches ethics
and modern philosophy, chairs the Peace and World Securities
Studies program, and advises the Philosophy club. Most of
her research and writing focusses on the role of ethics
within violent interpersonal relationships. At the end of
this conference she will celebrate her first wedding anniversary
with her sweetheart, Christian d'Orgeix, a herpetologist
and exotic chicken breeder extraordinaire. At home she enjoys
yoga, making vegetarian food taste good, and organic gardening
with the chickens, including Constance, Manfred, Kenji,
Sadako, Mirabelle, Norbert Jr., and Penelope, among others.
*******************************************
CHARLES HARVEY
Philosophy Department
University of Central Arkansas
<Charlesh@mail.uca.edu>
Authority, Autonomy, Authenticity: An
Etiological Understanding
In this essay I attempt to understand the
search for authenticity in terms of the breakdown of authority
in the modern world. The sense of autonomy, I argue, emerges
from the need to choose the authorities one will accept.
The ever-increasing difficulty of choosing from among authorities
is internalized and experienced as a difficulty of choosing
(or "finding") oneself. (The shattered authorities on the
outside, become a fragmented self on the inside.) The search
for the (authentic) self, then, is the search for an authority
on the inside that has been broken and lost on the outside.
I offer a sketch of what the authentic self would be (if
only it could be).
Charles Harvey is Professor of Philosophy
at the University of Central Arkansas. His areas of specialty
are 19th and 20th century continental philosophy. His recent
publications include "Paradise Well Lost: Communitarian
Nostalgia and the Lonely Logic of the Liberal
Self," in Philosophy in the Contemporary
World, v. 1, No. 1., "The Malice of Inanimates," in
Phenomenological Inquiry, and "Liberal Indoctrination
and the Problem of Community," in Synthese. He is
interested in problems of the self and social life and using
personal narrative to access philosophical problems.
*******************************************
LUCAS INTRONA
<L.INTRONA@lse.ac.uk>
Being-In-Cyberspace: Self and Hyperreality
Can I be in cyberspace? Is cyberspace a new
frontier for the realization of self? For Taylor and Saarinen,
and the psychologist Turkle, cyberspace is the practical
manifestation of postmodern reality, or rather, hyperreality
(Baudrillard). In hyperreal cyberspace I can 'change my
self as easily as I change my clothes.' This paper will
argue using the work of Martin Heidegger, that our being
is being-in-the-world. To be-in-the-world means to be involved
in the world; to have an involvement whole that is the always
already present sense of what I do. The paper
will argue that cyberspace as a hyperreal world will always,
to a greater or lesser extent, be occurrent (ready-at-hand).
It will argue that as an already present-at-hand world cyberspace
cannot function as an involvement whole, it will always
be inauthentic. This inauthenticity cannot be escaped. Any
cyber-traveller will eventually have to deal with the fact
of being in the world.
BIO NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME
*******************************************
JOE F.
JONES, III
Religion and Philosophy Department
Barton College
(919) 399-6448
<jjones@e-mail.barton.edu>
Interpretation and Its Objects
This will be a selective review of Michael
Krausz's recent work as it relates to the issue of realism
versus conventionalism. Michael's position is conventionalist,
but with some recent compromises which make for an interesting
and thoughtful position. Joe Jones is a realist, with interpretational
compromises toward conventionalism. The question is whether
epistemology takes priority over ontology, or ontology over
epistemology. Do we construct the world in which we live,
or find it? Are there examples which challenge decisions
either way? The format will be for Joe to present an overview
and criticism of Michael's position, and for Michael to
respond, with free discussion and commentary following.
Joe Frank Jones, III is Associate
Professor of Religion and Philosophy at Barton College in
Wilson, NC. He is married to Polly and has one child named
Jesse Leandra. He is the interim editor of the SPCW journal.
*******************************************
JEFFREY JORDON
<jjjordon@UDel.Edu>
A New Argument for Vegetarianism
ABSTRACT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME
Jeffrey Jordon is an associate professor
at the University of Delaware. He is co-author and editor
of Gambling on God: Essays on Pascal's Wager (1994),
co-editor of Faith, Freedom, and Rationality (1996),
and has published articles in Analysis, Hume Studies,
Journal of Social Philosophy, and Philosophia
as well as other journals.
*******************************************
MICHAEL KRAUSZ
Department of Philosophy
Bryn Mawr College
<mkrausz@brynmawr.edu>
Interpretation and Its Objects
This will be a selective review of Michael
Krausz's recent work as it relates to the issue of realism
versus conventionalism. Michael's position is conventionalist,
but with some recent compromises which make for an interesting
and thoughtful position. Joe Jones is a realist, with interpretational
compromises toward conventionalism. The question is whether
epistemology takes priority over ontology, or ontology over
epistemology. Do we construct the world in which we live,
or find it? Are there examples which challenge decisions
either way? The format will be for Joe to present an overview
and criticism of Michael's position, and for Michael to
respond, with free discussion and commentary following.
Michael Krausz is the Milton C. Nahm
Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Bryn
Mawr College. He is the author of Rightness and Reasons
and Varieties of Relativism (with Rom Harre), as
well as contributing editor of numerous volumes on such
topics as relativism, interpretation, interpretation of
music, creativity in science and art, cultural identity,
and the philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. Krausz has been
visiting professor at Georgetown, Oxford, Ulm, the India
Institute for Advanced Study among other institutions. As
well, Krausz is a painter whose works have appeared in eleven
one-person shows in galleries in the U.S. and the U.K.
*******************************************
ALEX KUKAS
National University
<azukas@nunic.nu.edu>
EcoMarxist-Feminism and the Cuban Agricultural
Collective
(A joint presentation with Louisa Moon)
In this presentation we would like to talk
about one Cuban agricultural collective, the UBPC's, from
an Ecofeminist interpretive stance, as it is informed by
our research and our recent experience in Cuba. Our experience
was that some hierarchies are more intractable than others.
Using excerpts from interviews we conducted and slides of
photographs we took, we will discuss our revised vision
of the effects of the reversal of the green revolution in
Cuba on relations of power and authority based on socio-economic
class, across gender and species, and between humans and
nonhuman animals. We will also discuss how our findings
impact on Ecofeminism and Ecomarxism. Does the fact that
socialization of production doesn't necessarily entail a
less sexist or speciest worldview mean that Ecomarxism doesn't
go far enough? Why doesn't a closer relationship with the
land and respect for the knowledge of indigenous peoples
translate into a closer relationship with nonhuman animals?
If Cuba were to embrace Ecofeminism would this translate
into a flattening of all hierarchical relations of authority
between humans and nonhuman nature? The evidence seems to
suggest that despite the increase in the status of women,
hierarchical relations based on species, for example, persist.
Does this imply that Ecofeminism alone does not go far enough
to break down these hierarchies? In the end we will propose
a theory, based on our findings, which incorporates both
Ecofeminism and Ecomarxism into a more comprehensive Social
Ecology which includes the best elements of each -- a sort
of Eco-Marxist-feminism.
BIO NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME
*******************************************
KEVIN MAGILL
<fa1918@wlv.ac.uk>
Free Will as Doing What You Want
ABSTRACT AND BIO NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS
TIME
*******************************************
ERIN MCKENNA
Department of Philosophy
Pacific Lutheran University
<mckenne@plu.edu>
The Culture of Suburbanization, Housework,
and the Fragmentation of Identity
ABSTRACT NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME
Erin McKenna is Assistant Professor
of Philosophy and Chair of Women's Studies at Pacific Lutheran
University. Her recent work includes papers on Charlotte
Perkins Gilman, concepts of home and self, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, John Dewey, and feminism and vegetarianism. She
spends her free time with my horse and two dogs.
*******************************************
MICHAEL
S. MCKENNA
Philosophy Department
Ithaca University
<MMCKENNA@ithaca.edu>
A Speaker Meaning Theory of Moral Responsibility
Theories of moral responsibility have traditionally
attempted to show that some metaphysical fact about an agent
obtains in order to show that a person is a morally responsible
agent. As an alternative to this approach, many philosophers
have sought refuge in P.F. Strawson's account of responsibility
by appeal to the reactive attitudes. Recently, many have
acknowledged problems with Strawson's account and have tried
to advance Strawson's thesis by appeal to various theoretical
conditions which an agent must satisfy in order to be an
"appropriate object of the morally reactive attitudes."
In this paper, I argue that the alternatives
explored as a means of advancing Strawson's theory are misguided.
In particular, they make what it is to be a morally responsible
agent depend upon whether members of a moral community are
willing to see a person as a responsible agent (and thus
react to, and treat her as one). Alternatively, I argue
that responsible moral agency can be advanced along the
lines Strawson has advised by understanding a competent
moral agent on analogy with a competent speaker's use of
a language. I argue that the kinds of social conventions
required to situate meaning by a speaker in a language are
useful in elucidating competent moral agency as well. Most
importantly, this kind of theoretical underpinning invites
no untoward metaphysical assumptions, thereby insulating
an account of moral responsibility form nervous worries
about the specter of determinism.
Michael S. McKenna is Assistant Professor
of Philosophy at Ithaca College. He has published various
articles on free will and moral responsibility. He also
has been known to ride a man mountain bike.
*******************************************
PETER MEHL
Department of Philosophy
University of Central Arkansas
<peterm@mail.uca.edu>
Matters of Meaning: Authenticity, Autonomy
and Authority in Kierkegaard
I argue that at least some of Kierkegaard's
authorship is designed to make a case for religious and
specifically Christian existence; he is not a total fideist.
He argues that anything short of the existential stance
of the "strong spiritual/moral evaluator" is despair. To
overcome this we are compelled to reach for religious or
transcendent sources of meaning; the authentic life is one
of autonomous engagement grounded in the authority of God.
But my question is how Kierkegaard justifies the stance
of the strong evaluator in the first place? I argue that
he crafts an existential and pragmatic case for it, but
that such an approach does not have the strength Kierkegaard
thinks. Indeed I argue that because this defense reflects
his own 19th century Christian context, his case for Christian
existence (as an existence of strong evaluation) is seriously
weakened.
Peter Mehl is currently Associate
Professor of Philosophy and Assistant Dean in the College
of Liberal Arts at the University of Central Arkansas. He
has a long-standing interest in Kierkegaard's thought as
well as in philosophy of religion and ethics. He has written
for the Journal of Religious Ethics, the International Journal
of Applied Philosophy and has an essay in a volume of International
Kierkegaard Commentary (Mercer Univ. Press).
*******************************************
LOUISA MOON
Mira Costa College
<lmoon@miracosta.cc.ca.us>
EcoMarxist-Feminism and the Cuban Agricultural
Collective
(A joint presentation with Alex Kukas)
In this presentation we would like to talk
about one Cuban agricultural collective, the UBPC's, from
an Ecofeminist interpretive stance, as it is informed by
our research and our recent experience in Cuba. Our experience
was that some hierarchies are more intractable than others.
Using excerpts from interviews we conducted and slides of
photographs we took, we will discuss our revised vision
of the effects of the reversal of the green revolution in
Cuba on relations of power and authority based on socio-economic
class, across gender and species, and between humans and
nonhuman animals. We will also discuss how our findings
impact on Ecofeminism and Ecomarxism. Does the fact that
socialization of production doesn't necessarily entail a
less sexist or speciest worldview mean that Ecomarxism doesn't
go far enough? Why doesn't a closer relationship with the
land and respect for the knowledge of indigenous peoples
translate into a closer relationship with nonhuman animals?
If Cuba were to embrace Ecofeminism would this translate
into a flattening of all hierarchical relations of authority
between humans and nonhuman nature? The evidence seems to
suggest that despite the increase in the status of women,
hierarchical relations based on species, for example, persist.
Does this imply that Ecofeminism alone does not go far enough
to break down these hierarchies? In the end we will propose
a theory, based on our findings, which incorporates both
Ecofeminism and Ecomarxism into a more comprehensive Social
Ecology which includes the best elements of each -- a sort
of Eco-Marxist-feminism.
BIO NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME
*******************************************
JADA PRANE
University of Oregon
<jprane@darkwing.uoregon.edu>
Homelessness ... Considerations on Redirecting
the Blame
In the contemporary world a new philosophical
problem has emerged. It is a practical, ethical, and social
question whether a person's inalienable right to shelter
should triumph over built America's right to be aesthetically,
economically, and environmentally protected from illegally
constructed dwellings. An inalienable right to shelter used
to be assumed by early America. It is only since the inception
of planning and zoning regulations and building codes, i.e.
their omission of shelter language, their unacknowledged
skew of the word "public", and their increasingly higher
minimum building standards, that has squashed certain individuals
inalienable right to protect themselves form the elements.
Redefining the planning and zoning word "building" to include
the term "shelter" and defining home by Clare Cooper Marcus'
description as literally a "self-extension into personalizable
space" can re-open the possibility for considering shelter-making
as an inalienable right, rather than merely a right or a
privilege. As an inalienable right each and every person
is entitled to make shelter for themselves.
Jada Prane is a philosophical counselor
with interests in concepts of selfhood, the study of philosophy
of psychopathology, and clinical work with persons suffering
from chronic mental illness. These interests in conjunction
with many years working with city, county, and state agencies
as a real estate broker and developer has combined to prompt
her interest in the topic of homeless selves. Jada is in
the final stages of completing her dissertation about the
philosophical underpinnings of multiple personality disorder
entitled, The Bloodletting of the Ontologically Challenged.
She expects to complete her Ph.D. from the University of
Oregon in December 1997.
*******************************************
GAIL PRESBEY
Philosophy Department
Marist College
<JZNH@MARISTB.MARIST.EDU>
Akan Chiefs and Queen Mothers in Contemporary
Ghana: Examples of Democracy, or Accountable Authority?
The paper is based on my research last summer
in Ghana, where I interviewed chiefs and Queen Mothers about
their leadership role in their communities. My interest
was framed by an existing debate found in the works of Ghanaian
philosophers Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu. They suggested
that Ghana did not need Western models of democracy, because
the traditional Akan governing system was inherently democratic.
Anthony Appiah as well had written that Ghana worked best
when its official "Western" government was temporarily defunct
and the remaining social organizations coordinated life
on a voluntary basis, being popularly accepted by the people.
To argue that the Akan system is "democratic" seems to fly
in the face of evidence that the traditional structure is
a hierarchy, as pointed out by Emmanuel Eze. I suggest that
based on my interviews, the Akan system is more aptly called
an authoritarian system that gains its acceptability by
its many relations with community members. It however falls
short of an ideal democracy in the same way that Western
democracies fall short - the discrediting or marginalization
of some people's voices. However, in its cultural context,
it clearly succeeds where Western style democracy falls
short.
Gail Presbey is Assistant. Professor
of Philosophy at Marist College in Poughkeepsie, NY. She
recently spent a year-long sabbatical in eight different
countries in Africa. She has published several articles
on African Philosophy, and is first editor of a textbook,
"The Philosophical Quest: A Cross-Cultural Reader" published
with McGraw-Hill.
*******************************************
LANI ROBERTS
Department of Philosophy
Oregon State University
<robertsl@cla.orst.edu>
One Oppression or Many?
In spite of the wide-ranging consequences
of institutionalized domination, there are few theories
of models in philosophy characterizing the structure of
oppression. From a myriad of differences, whether real or
imagined, a few aspects of who humans are become the basis
for what Philip Hallie calls "institutional cruelty." Some
of these differences in our society include, but are not
limited to, race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation,
social and economic class, religious belief, disability
and age.
Although existing philosophical analyses
differ at one level, that is, according to the various target
groups, they also share considerable common features. In
spite of theoretical similarities, they is a strong presupposition
to the effect that each form of systematic domination is
essentially distinct from the others. Sexism is something
different than racism, which is clearly distinct from classism.
My question is whether there are many oppressions or one.
This question, to my knowledge, has yet to be raised and
this paper will try to do just this.
Lani Roberts teaches philosophy at
Oregon State University in Corvallis, Oregon. She counts
herself as a moral philosopher and focusses her attention
primarily on the philosophy of oppression, teaching feminist
philosophies, ethics of diversity and moral theory courses.
She has been on the faculty of the University Honors College
for the past two years and has begun a term as a Master
Teacher in the College of Liberal Arts.
*******************************************
WILLIAM
L. ROWE
Philosophy Department
Purdue University
<wlrowe@purdue.edu>
The Metaphysics of Freedom: Reid's Theory
of Agent Causation
A libertarian theory of human freedom requires
attributing a power to the agent to determine what he shall
will to do, not just a power to do what he wills
to do. This power is best thought of as a causal power
the agent has over the determination of her will. Thomas
Reid developed a sophisticated theory wherein this power
is the power an agent has to cause or not cause a particular
volition to perform a certain act. In this paper I first
explain his theory of agent causation and defend that theory
against some important objections philosophers have advanced
against it.
William L. Rowe is Professor of Philosophy
at Purdue University. He has taught at the University of
Illinois and held visiting appointments at Wayne State University
and the University of Michigan. His publications include
Religious Symbols and God, The Cosmological Argument,
Philosophy of Religion, Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality,
and numerous articles. He has held a Guggenheim Fellowship,
been a fellow at the National Humanities Center, and is
a past president of the Central Division of the American
Philosophical Association.
*******************************************
JAMES SAUER
St. Mary's University
San Antonio, Texas
<philjim@stmarytx.edu>
Language, Ethics, and Meaning: A Phenomenological
Correlation of Morality and Self-Conscious Signification
In this paper I am taking up an underdeveloped
argument of Charles Taylor that linguisticality is constitutive
of moral agency. Taylor's argument is part of a set of contemporary
position that argues that language, especially as dialogue
or discourse, is the normative framework that grounds or
validates fundamental norms or values. There is little question
that Taylor's contribution to this "dialogical turn" is
substantial and innovative; however, it is not without weakness.
What I am going to argue is that language does ground morality
as a distinctively human way of creating meaning that is,
as Taylor argues, constitutive of the self and self-understanding.
Such self-understanding or the appropriation of moral self-consciousness
is what is meant by authenticity and autonomy that are constitutive
of moral authority.
James Sauer is an associate professor
of philosophy at St. Mary's University where he specialized
in ethics and applied ethics. His particular fields of concern
are environmental and economic philosophy.
*******************************************
JENNIFER
STIFF
<jastiff@artsci.wustl.edu> The
Question of National Autonomy: The Case of Cuba
The United States is a country which places
a high value on political autonomy and self-government.
In this paper I argue that since the United States values
and accepts autonomy and self-government for itself that
it should also recognize the autonomous self-government
of other nations. After establishing this I tackle the difficult
case of Cuba, a nation which is considered by many to be
illiberal. I consider whether it matters that Cuba's autonomous
self-government is in danger and on what grounds Cuba should
have autonomy in government.
BIO NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME
*******************************************
PATRICIA J.
THOMPSON
Women's Studies and Education
Lehman College, CUNY
Hestianeutics: A Challenge for Feminist
Standpoint Theory
Last year at Estes Park the paper "Re-claiming
Hestia, Goddess of Everyday Life" proposed a feminist re-thinking
of the oikos/polis split that occurred in classical antiquity.
The split shaped subsequent philosophical discourse -- subordinating
the domestic economy (oikonomeia) to the political economy.
This paper builds on the proposed dual systems Hestian/Hermean
paradigm that schematizes the relation of the oikos to the
polis and the private/public dichotomy, arguing that it
warrants further investigation and explication.
This paper examines the effect of this paradigm
shift on discourse, text, and epistemology. As a contrast
with the masculist "hermeneutic" approach, it suggest an
alternative interpretive standpoint, namely a "hestianeutic"
as a way to deepen textual understanding. The two standpoints
are viewed as complementary "takes" on social reality and
social phenomena. I suggest that the Hestian standpoint
offers a consistent approach for the deconstruction of patriarchal
(Hermean) discourse that feminists argue has historically
been silenced. By contrasting hestianeutic/hermeneutic interpretative
standpoints it moves "beyond gender" toward a "nonsexist"
humanism appropriate for both males and females in both
the private/public domains.
Patricia J. Thompson is currently
Professor of Women's Studies and Education at Lehman College,
City University of New York. She has lectured widely throughout
the United States, Canada, and Europe (Russia, Germany,
and Finland) on Hestian feminism. She is the author of Bringing
Feminism Home (1992) and The Hestian Synthesis
(1988) published by the UPEI Publishing Collective, Charlottetown,
PEI, Canada. Her articles have appeared in Hypatia,
Themis, and the CUNY Women's Coalition Journal.
Recent chapters have appeared in The Knowledge Explosion
(Athene Series - TC Press, 1992), edited by Cheris Kramarae
and Dale Spender, and The Education Feminism Reader
(Routledge, 1994), edited by Lynda Stone. Articles have
also appeared in German, Finnish, and Greek publications.
Her current research interests are in feminist theory, gender
equity, women and the environment, and the reconceptualization
of the disciplines. She has recently edited Environmental
Education for the Twenty-first Century, published by
Peter Lung.
*******************************************
JOSEPH WAGNER
Political Science Department
Colgate University
<JWAGNER@CENTER.COLGATE.EDU>
A Hollow Core: The Poverty of Conservativism
as Political Philosophy
This paper focusses on the nature of conservatism
as a political philosophy, but do so in very different ways.
I argue that the chief defect of conservativism as a philosophical
position is that it cannot honor the authority of reason
or argument. In particular, I look critically at conservative
responses to liberal theory, to see if I can explain why
conservatives seem not to understand the philosophical assumptions
that undergird liberalism. These assumptions are essentially
epistemic and they derive in a direct fashion from the Enlightenment.
At issue are fundamental questions about ontology, teleology
and essence and more particularly the way in which these
notions relate to ideas about 'good' and 'right.' In the
analysis, I explore the defects of natural law and natural
rights theories with the intent of explaining why such theories
are seductive to conservatives. Finally, this paper attempts
to speak in a fresh way to the relationship between conservatism,
religion and the state.
Joseph Wagner is a Professor of political
science at Colgate University. His work and his interests
are analytic and theoretical. His published articles treat
issues of affirmative action, tolerance, mass media, public
opinion, multiculturalism, liberal arts education, moral
psychology, moral development and the nature of rationality.
Professor Wagner's degree is in Interdisciplinary Social
Science and his dissertation concentrated on linguistic
analysis. He is currently completing a manuscript on moral
psychology that reflects an ongoing interest in ethics,
philosophy of mind, neuro-psychology, Kant, Darwin and Wittgenstein.
*******************************************
JACK WEIR
Philosophy Department
Morehead State University
<j.weir@morehead-st.edu>
Utilitarianism, Animals, and the Environment
In this paper, I analyze the relationship
of recent environmental and animal ethics to utilitarianism.
John Passmore, Elliott Sober, Peter Singer, Val Plumwood,
and Richard Sylvan are examined. I conclude that utilitarianism
makes important contributions to an adequate theory of animals
and the environment, but that more is needed. Some suggestions
are made for developing an adequate theory.
Jack Weir is Professor of Philosophy
at Morehead State University in Kentucky. His recent writing
has been primarily in environmental ethics. Before coming
to Morehead, he taught at Hardin-Simmons University in Abilene,
Texas. He is the founding Editor of the Society's journal,
Philosophy in the Contemporary World, and is currently the
Editor of the Newsletter of the International Society for
Environmental Ethics.
*******************************************
FORREST
WOOD, JR.
Philosophy and Religion Department
University of Southern Mississippi
<fwood@ocean.st.usm.edu>
Hunting: Three Views
Recently three books have been published
on the nature of hunting: Cartmill's A View To A Death In
The Morning (1993) which is an anti-hunting position, Swan's
In Defense of Hunting (1996) which is pro-hunting, and my
book, The Delights and Dilemmas of Hunting (1997) which
presents the arguments for both sides and evaluates them.
I make a distinction between the motivations and the justifications
of hunters. Cartmill's position against hunting (really
against meat-eating) is argued in two ways. The first is
his continuity/rights argument and the second is his killing
is not necessary argument. I argue that his claim of the
connection of continuity and rights does not hold. I also
argue that his killing is not necessary argument is macrocentric
and therefore fails.
Forrest Wood, Jr. is Professor of
Philosophy and Religion at the University of Southern Mississippi.
He has taught at USM for 31 years and is currently serving
as Chair of the Department. He has published a book in philosophy
of religion, Whiteheadian Thought As A Basis For A Philosophy
of Religion (1986), a book on the philosophy of hunting,
The Delights and Dilemmas of Hunting: The Hunting versus
Anti-hunting Controversy (1997), and many articles in philosophical
journals. He has also published nature articles in Mississippi
Outdoors and Magnolia Turkey Tales. A native Texan, he was
educated at Baylor University, Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary, and Tulane University. He taught in Texas, Louisiana
and Mississippi. He is one of those people Aldo Leopold
referred to as those who cannot live without wild things.
He has sought to understand a boyhood passion for hunting,
an adult's love of the land and an old man's vision of enspoiled
nature. The delights and dilemmas of this quest continue
to engage him.
