About the society
APA Divsion Meetings
CFP: Consciousness, Emotion & the Hard-Problem (APA-ED)
CFP: Common Good
CFP: 2004 CFP annual conference
 

About the journal

Index Vols 1-9

Abstracts Vols 1-5
Abstracts Vols 6-9
Abstracts Vol. 10:1
Abstracts Vol. 10:2
Conferences
2003 APA Eastern Division Meeting

2004 APA Pacific Division Meeting

2003 Conf accomodation info 

Conference archives

1996 program

1997 program
1998 program
'1999 Program
2000 Program
2001 Program
2002 program

2003 Conference Prog.

 

 

Gadamer on Experience and Questioning   

Jeremiah Conway

 

Department of Philosophy

University of Southern Maine

Portland, OR

jconway@maine.rr.com

 

The suspicion of this article is that we don’t really understand why questions matter.  It addresses this topic by examining the connection Hans-Georg Gadamer draws in Truth and Method between questioning and the possibility of experience.  It outlines what Gadamer means by “experience” and shows why he is convinced that we cannot have experiences without asking questions.

 

 

Connectionist Agency

David DeMoss

 

Department of Philosophy

Pacific University

Forest Grove, OR

demossdj@pacificu.edu

 

Any mind-brain theory eventually will have to deal with agency. I do not claim that no other theory could do this successfully. I do claim that connectionism is able to handle some key features of agency. First, I will offer a brief account of connectionism and the advantages of using it to account for human agency, comparing and contrasting connectionism with two other mind-brain accounts in cognitive science, symbolicism and dynamicism. Then, since a connectionist account of agency depends on a unique approach to inner representations, I discuss the connectionist account of representation and the implications this has for our appeal to reasons in explanations of human action. I conclude that, given a connectionist brain account, reasons cannot be causes.

 

 

Philosophical Counseling: A Paradigm for Clinical Medical Ethics?

M. Carmela Epright

 

Department of Philosophy

Furman University

3300 Poinsett Highway

Greenville, SC 29617

Carmela.Epright@furman.edu

 

In this paper I will move away from what has become the “traditional” approach to writing and thinking about philosophical counseling – I will not compare and contrast the virtues of the philosophical and psychological paradigms, nor will I attempt to defend philosophical counseling against its critics.  Instead, I will use the methods and practices employed by philosophical counselors as a paradigm to inform and govern another philosophical practice, that is, clinical medical ethics.  I will show that clinical ethics and philosophical counseling share many common attributes, and argue that each discipline has much to offer to the other.

 

 

Philosophical Counseling:  An Almost Alternative Paradigm

Sara Waller

 

Philosophy Department

California State University Dominguez Hills

1000 E. Victoria St.

Carson, CA 90747

swaller@csudh.edu

 

I offer a method for philosophical counseling that is contrasted with Marinoff’s. This version of philosophical counseling is primarily epistemic and suggests therapy as the examination of the justification of a client’s beliefs, with a goal of enabling the client to change belief systems if the client so chooses.

 

 

Toleration and the Limits of the Moral Imagination

Andrew Fiala

 

Department of Humanistic Studies

University of Wisconsin-Green Bay

2420 Nicolet Drive

Green Bay, WI  54311

fialaa@uwgb.edu

 

This essay discusses one source of toleration: a modest recognition of the limits of our ability to imagine the situation of the other.  It further connects this with both respect for the autonomy of the other and the moral need to engage the other in dialogue.  The conclusion is that toleration is important in light of the ubiquity of failures of the moral imagination.  It considers several examples of the failure of the moral imagination, including a discussion of the Hindu practice of sati or widow burning.

 

 

Three Problems for the Aesthetic Foundations of Environmental Ethics

J. Robert Loftis

 

Department of Philosophy

Auburn University

6080 Haley Center

Auburn AL, 36849

loftijr@auburn.edu

 

This essay takes a critical look at aesthetics as the basis for nature preservation, presenting three reasons why we should not rely on aesthetic foundations to justify the environmentalist program. First, a comparison to other kinds of aesthetic value shows that the aesthetic value of nature can provide weak reasons for action at best. Second, not everything environmentalists want to protect has positive aesthetic qualities. Attempts have been made to get around this problem by developing a reformist attitude towards natural aesthetics. I argue that these approaches fail. Third, development can be as aesthetically positive as nature. If it is simply beauty we are looking for, why can’t the beauty of a well-constructed dam or a magnificent skyscraper suffice?

 

 

Judgement in African Thought

Sylvanus Ifeanyi Nnoruka

 

St. Joseph Major Seminary

P.M.B. 1039, Ikot-Ekpene

Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria.

sylvanus_nnoruka@yahoo.com

 

Critical thinking plays a role in African judgement. Here, factors that influence judgement are: culture, communalism, wisdom of elders, revelation from the gods, and observation. Factors that obstruct judgement include: colonialism, modernization, and new religions. However, thanks to Kant’s critical philosophy, only objectively valid knowledge is actually knowledge in African traditional thought.

 

 

Culture and the Specification of Environmental Virtue

Ronald Sandler

 

Department of Philosophy

Southern Illinois University - Edwardsville

Edwardsville, Illinois 62026-1433

rsandler@siue.edu

 

One concern about a virtue ethics approach to environmental ethics is that virtue ethics lack the theoretical resources to provide a specification of environmental virtue that does not pander to obtaining cultural practices and conceptions of the human-nature relationship. In this paper I argue that this concern is unfounded.

 

 

Notes Toward a Philosophy of Nonviolence: A City In Which Violence Is Not Necessary

Steven Schroeder

 

5710 S. Kimbark #3

Chicago, IL 60637_1615

sh_schroeder_7@alumni.uchicago.edu

 

This paper takes Gandhi’s satyagraha, which he defined as “holding on to truth” (associating it simultaneously with knowing and doing) as a basis for a political philosophy of nonviolence that draws on  voices familiar from twentieth century nonviolent struggles as well as sociobiology, literary criticism, and feminist approaches to sacrifice.

 

Authority, Epistemic Privileging, and Democratic Deliberation

Kory Spencer Sorrell

 

5909 Lindenhurst Avenue

Los Angeles, CA 90036

korysorrell@attbi.com

 

This essay focuses on the role relationships of authority play in the communal production of knowledge. The author draws on recent developments in feminist epistemology and the pragmatism of John Dewey to show that not only is authority  representation ineluctable, but is desirable if held properly accountable.

 

 

The Philosopher as Prophet: The Case of Emerson and Thoreau

Alfred I. Tauber

 

Department of Philosophy

Boston University

Boston, MA

ait@bu.edu

 

Emerson articulated his metaphysics of selfhood within a theistic framework; Thoreau reconfigured his ideas as a mystical pantheism. In this latter form, Transcendentalism offered twentieth century Americans a new religious sensibility based on an intimacy with  nature, which became a spiritual and aesthetic resource for personal fulfillment.

 

 

Trust and the Curse of Cassandra  (An Exploration of the Value of Trust)

Cynthia Townley

 

University of Nevada Las Vegas

4505 Maryland Parkway

Box 455028

Las Vegas, NV 89154-5028

cynthia.townley@ccmail.nevada.edu

 

Epistemological interest in trust concentrates mainly on whether and how it is a proper resource for responsible knowers. However, trust is important and valuable to epistemic agents for reasons that do not depend on its being knowledge-conducive, or knowledge enhancing. Being trusted is essential for full participation in an epistemic community. The story of Cassandra illustrates these dimensions of trust’s value.

 

 

EPISTEMIC TRUST

Linda Zagzebski

 

Kingfisher College Chair of the Philosophy of Religion and Ethics

Department of Philosophy

Oklahoma University

Norman Oklahoma 73019

lzagzebski@ou.edu

 

 The value of epistemic trust has been neglected, as Townsley rightly observes, but I think a virtue epistemology of the kind I endorse is well suited to provide a framework for understanding it. The Cassandra of Greek legend illustrates the complex relationships among epistemic and non-epistemic goods, as well as the fragility of knowledge. I think her case leads us to a more radical conclusion than the one Townsley proposes.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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